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Abstract
This Article seeks to address important questions raised by pretrial detention and judicial re-
form in Latin America. It analyzes the potential impact of criminal procedure reforms on pretrial
detention rates. It also discusses whether more general ‘rule of law‘ reforms promoted by inter-
national donor organizations like the World Bank can affect the abuses associated with prolonged
pretrial detention–whether, in other words, the circle may be squared between economic devel-
opment and human rights. In addition, this Article describes the adoption of central elements of
an American-style adversarial system in Latin America and its prospects for influencing judicial
reform. It argues that while human rights advocacy and formal criminal procedure reforms con-
stitute an integral part of combating prolonged pretrial detention, they must be accompanied by
meaningful structural reforms that promote the independence of the judiciary, the adaptation of re-
forms to each country’s unique political, social, and cultural history, the establishment of effective
provisions for pretrial release such as bail statutes, and the adoption of lending policies by donor
organizations that encompass criminal as well as civil law reform. Part I describes the problem of
prolonged pretrial detention and its link to other human rights abuses in Latin American prisons.
It also describes the causes of extraordinarily high pretrial detention rates, including the absence
of effective provisions for pretrial release and the slow, archaic procedures of civil law inquisito-
rial criminal justice systems. Part II outlines the international human rights norms governing the
detention of accused persons. It also summarizes legal challenges to excessive pretrial detention
in Latin America as well as in other regions. Part III discusses the criminal procedure reforms
adopted in several Latin American countries. It focuses on how the reforms affect not only pretrial
detention but also the country’s criminal justice system as a whole. This Part then discusses the
more general judicial reform policies of international donor organizations and their potential im-
pact on human rights abuses like prolonged pretrial detention. Part IV describes several strategies
for reducing pretrial detention in the future. It underscores the need to establish effective mecha-
nisms for pretrial release such as bail statutes. It also discusses the need to alter the behavior of key
actors in the criminal justice system, especially judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and to
adapt reforms to the particular political and social climate within the target countries. Finally, it
underscores the role leading international donor organizations can play by linking ongoing judicial
reform projects with human rights abuses like pretrial detention.
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INTRODUCTION
Excessive pretrial detention remains one of the most severe
human rights problems in Latin America. Between seventy to
ninety percent of inmates in Latin American prisons have never
been convicted of a crime but are being held pending trial. Pro-
longed detention of those who have yet to be convicted not only
violates international human rights norms but also contributes
to the overcrowding, violence, and other deplorable conditions
in many Latin American prisons.
Human rights advocates have challenged instances of pro-
longed pretrial detention and won significant victories, includ-
ing at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. These
victories have affirmed and expanded the international norms
governing the treatment of prisoners.
Also, many of the region's criminal justice systems are un-
dergoing significant reforms. Countries such as Bolivia, Chile,
Guatemala, and Venezuela, have introduced far-reaching
changes to their criminal procedure codes that seek to increase
efficiency and, in turn, reduce the staggering levels of pretrial
detention. These changes impose time limits on investigations,
institute speedy trial provisions, and establish more judicial over-
sight at all stages of the criminal process, including pretrial de-
tention. They reflect a historic shift from an inquisitorial system
of justice - the traditional model in Latin America - to an
adversarial one. For example, criminal procedure reforms estab-
lish open public trials with oral proceedings and give investiga-
tive powers to prosecutors rather than judges. The effect of
these reforms on rates of pretrial detention has, however, yet to
be determined.
In addition, Latin American countries have been the objects
of a broader judicial reform movement aimed at modernizing
slow, sometimes dangerously inefficient civil law systems. The
principal motive of this movement is economic - that promot-
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ing good government and the rule of law will make the region's
legal systems more market-friendly and create the necessary con-
ditions for economic development in today's global economy.
Some form of judicial reform initiative is currently underway in
approximately eighty percent of the countries in the region.
The reforms are backed by leading international donor organi-
zations like the World Bank, which has invested over US$300
million in judicial reform projects in Latin America, as well as by
the United States Agency for International Development
("USAID"), which has played an important role in the region for
several decades. The reforms include promoting judicial inde-
pendence, speeding the processing of cases, increasing access to
dispute resolution mechanisms, and professionalizing the bench
and bar.
This Article seeks to address important questions raised by
pretrial detention and judicial reform in Latin America. It ana-
lyzes the potential impact of criminal procedure reforms on pre-
trial detention rates. It also discusses whether more general
"rule of law" reforms promoted by international donor organiza-
tions like the World Bank can affect the abuses associated with
prolonged pretrial detention - whether, in other words, the cir-
cle may be squared between economic development and human
rights. In addition, this Article describes the adoption of central
elements of an American-style adversarial system in Latin
America and its prospects for influencing judicial reform. It ar-
gues that while human rights advocacy and formal criminal pro-
cedure reforms constitute an integral part of combating pro-
longed pretrial detention, they must be accompanied by mean-
ingful structural reforms that promote the independence of the
judiciary, the adaptation of reforms to each country's unique po-
litical, social, and cultural history, the establishment of effective
provisions for pretrial release such as bail statutes, and the adop-
tion of lending policies by donor organizations that encompass
criminal as well as civil law reform.
Part I describes the problem of prolonged pretrial deten-
tion and its link to other human rights abuses in Latin American
prisons. It also describes the causes of extraordinarily high pre-
trial detention rates, including the absence of effective provi-
sions for pretrial release and the slow, archaic procedures of civil
law inquisitorial criminal justice systems.
Part II outlines the international human rights norms gov-
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erning the detention of accused persons. It also summarizes le-
gal challenges to excessive pretrial detention in Latin America as
well as in other regions.
Part III discusses the criminal procedure reforms adopted
in several Latin American countries. It focuses on how the re-
forms affect not only pretrial detention but also the country's
criminal justice system as a whole. This Part then discusses the
more general judicial reform policies of international donor or-
ganizations and their potential impact on human rights abuses
like prolonged pretrial detention.
Part IV describes several strategies for reducing pretrial de-
tention in the future. It underscores the need to establish effec-
tive mechanisms for pretrial release such as bail statutes. It also
discusses the need to alter the behavior of key actors in the crim-
inal justice system, especially judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys, and to adapt reforms to the particular political and
social climate within the target countries. Finally, it underscores
the role leading international donor organizations can play by
linking ongoing judicial reform projects with human rights
abuses like pretrial detention.
1. THE SCOPE AND CAUSES OF PROLONGED
PRETRIAL DETENTION
Excessive pretrial detention is one of the most pressing is-
sues confronting the criminal justice systems of countries
throughout Latin America. Seventy to ninety percent of inmates
currently incarcerated in Latin American countries have never
been tried or sentenced.' Because they have cases pending at
some stage of the process, these inmates are commonly known as
procesados. In Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay, for example,
approximately ninety percent of inmates are unconvicted;2 in
the Dominican Republic, the figure is approximately eighty-five
percent;' in Haiti, it is approximately eighty percent;4 and in
1. See, e.g., J. Brady Anderson, IPromoting the Rule of Law Around the World, 36 TRIAL
84, 85 (2000).
2. See HUMAN RiHIS WATCH PRISON PROIECT, PRISONERS IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN, available at http://www.h-w.org/advocacy/piisoners/americas.htm.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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Venezuela, it was approximately seventy-five percent 5 until re-
cent reforms reduced that number.6 Even in those countries
with relatively better records in this respect, such as Brazil,
roughly one-third of the inmate population is unconvicted.7
The large number of unconvicted prisoners in Latin
America is a central cause of the severe overcrowding and associ-
ated abuses for which the region's prisons are notorious. The
prisons often contain appalling living conditions, prisoner-on-
prisoner violence, and abuses by guards.8 Massacres and riots
have occurred in prisons throughout the region. Overcrowding
is the most severe problem facing Brazil's prison system - the
region's largest, contributing to often wretched conditions,
heightened tension among inmates, inmate-on-inmate violence,
attacks on guards, and riots.' Similarly, overcrowding is a pri-
mary cause of the extreme violence in Venezuelan prisons.10
Latin American prisons, according to one account, constitute
"repositories for the accumulated woes crippling the region's
justice systems.""
The general denial of pretrial release to criminal defend-
ants and the excessive duration of criminal proceedings contrib-
ute significantly to excessive pretrial detention. Countries in
Latin America generally lack any effective means of provisional
pretrial release pending prosecution (such as bail statutes in the
United States). While there has been some movement towards
increasing the availability of pretrial release, the effect thus far
has been limited. Venezuela enacted legislation to allow for pro-
visional release pending prosecution, but it was never imple-
5. See HUMAN RicHrTs AA1T-cH/AMERICAS, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL: PRISON CON-
DITIONS IN VENEZUELA 2 (1997) [hereinafter PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL].
6. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRV REPORTS: VENEZUELA (2001) (describing a
57% decrease in 2000 in the number of detained prisoners who had not been convicted
of a crime).
7. See HUMAN RIG, ITS WNATI, BEHIND BARS IN BRAZIL, available, at http://www.hrw.
org/reports98/brazil/Brazil.hti.
8. See, e.g., PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL, supra n.5.
9. See HUMAN RIGI'rS WATri, BEHIND BARS IN BRAZIL, ch. ill (1998); Americas: In-
side Latin America's Worst Prison, BBC NEWS, Dec. 14, 1998 (describing a 1992 riot at Sao
Paolo prison that left over one hundred inmates dead); Sebastian Rotella, Brazil Unlocks
Jail Reforns.ustice, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999 (stating that overcrowding of prisons turns
jails and police lockups into "de/facto penitentiaries").
10. See, e.g., Venezuela Prison Violence Claims Ten, BBC 'WORLD, Dec. 10, 1998.
11. Rotella, supra n.9.
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mented.12 In Brazil, judges have failed to take advantage of al-
ternative sentencing measures despite recent efforts by the gov-
ernment to increase their use."3
The excessive duration of criminal proceedings results
partly from the inquisitorial model that has traditionally charac-
terized Latin American legal systems. Inquisitorial systems are
characterized by extensive pretrial investigation and interroga-
tion to ensure that no innocent person actually goes to trial.' 4
Pretrial investigation, which is secret, takes a great deal of time
and is vulnerable to abuse. 5 The responsibility for prosecuting,
defending, and adjudicating cases is concentrated in the judge,
who develops the evidence at trial and calls and questions wit-
nesses himself, the role of the public prosecutor and defense at-
torney is usually restricted to asking follow-up questions or sug-
gesting lines of inquiry.'"
The reliance on written documents rather than oral testi-
mony in inquisitorial systems also increases delays. Moreover,
the process generally cannot be truncated by the defendant's
guilty plea but must continue through trial and sentencing.1 7 As
a result, many unconvicted inmates spend several years behind
bars awaiting a verdict in the cases against them. Indeed, some
remain in prison for a longer period than if they had been con-
victed of the crime itself. While this problem is not unique to
inquisitorial systems in Latin America," the relative lack of re-
sources in the region exacerbates its severity.
12. See PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL, supra n.5, at 30; DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY
REPORTS: VENEZUELA, supra n.6 (describing implementation of the Codigo Organico
Processal Penal in 2000).
13. DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPoRrs: BRAZIL (2001); Rotella, supra n.9
(noting that only about 3% of offenders in Brazil are sentenced to community service
or probation, compared with about 30% in the United States).
14. See ERIA S. FAIRCHILD & HARRY R. DAMMER, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 125 (2000).
15. See Steven E. Hendrix, Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America: Guate-
mala's Conversion to the Adversarial System, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 365, 390 (1998).
16. William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure:
The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YAI.EJ. INT'L
L. 1, 7 (1992).
17. FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra n.14, at 127.
18. See Hendrix, supra n.15, at 390 (noting that in France, 51.9% of those in deten-
tion were awaiting trial rather than serving sentences); Pizzi, supra n. 16, at 6 (citing the
"staggering inefficiency" of the Italian criminal justice system as a cause of the shift
from an inquisitorial to adversarial system, and noting that the enormous backlog of
cases delayed even routine cases for ten years or longer).
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II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GOVERNING
PRETRIAL DETENTION
Excessive detention before trial violates established interna-
tional human rights norms. Article 9(3) of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") establishes a
general presumption of release pending trial,' 9 as does Article
7(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights. 2" The
United Nations Human Rights Committee has suggested that Ar-
ticle 9(3) of the ICCPR means that accused persons should be
detained prior to trial only "to prevent flight, interference with
evidence, or the recurrence of crime" or "where the person con-
stitutes a clear and serious threat to society which cannot be con-
tained in any other manner. "21
Particularly lengthy periods of pretrial detention also violate
provisions of the ICCPR guaranteeing the right to "trial within a
reasonable time or to release ' 22 and to trial "without undue de-
lay,"23 and provisions of the American Convention on Human
Rights ensuring a right to be tried "within a reasonable time.
'
"24
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has indicated
that detention of four years or more before trial may violate the
ICCPR's right to trial without undue delay.25 In extreme cases,
prolonged detention before trial may also violate the presump-
19. See International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A
(xxi), art. 9(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 171 & 1057 U.N.T.S. at 407 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR]. Article 9(3) states: "It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial
shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for
trial." Id. See also General Comment No. 8 of the Human Rights Committee on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9 (Sixth Sess. 1982), Report of
the Human Rights Committee, adopted Apr. 12, 1984 by the Human Rights Commit-
tee, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (stating "[p]re-trial detention
should be an exception and as short as possible").
20. See American Convention on Human RightsJuly 18, 1978, art. 7(5), OEA/Ser.
L.V./II.82, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (right of detained person to appear promptly before a
judicial official and to be tried "within a reasonable time or be released without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings.").
21. Hugo van Alphen v. the Netherlands (No. 305/1988) (July 23, 1990), Official
Records of the General Assembly, Forty-Fifth Session, Supplement 40A (A/45/40), vol.
II, annex IX, sect. M, para. 5.8, cited in PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL, supra n.5, at 33 n.72.
22. See ICCPR, supra n.19, art. 9(3).
23. Id. art. 14(3)(c). A defendant must, however, receive "adequate time ... for
the preparation of his defense." Id. art. 14(3)(b).
24. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra n.20, art. 8(1).
25. See Fillastre v. Bolivia (No. 336/1988) (Nov. 6, 1991), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/
D/336/1988 (1991).
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tion of innocence itself.
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But while international human rights norms limit the lawful
length of detention before trial, excessive detention remains en-
demic to regions such as Latin America. The next Part examines
current reform efforts that, directly or indirectly, attempt to ad-
dress this problem.
III. PRETRIAL DETENTION AND CURRENT REFORMS
This Part examines judicial reform efforts in Latin America.
It first discusses criminal procedure reforms, focusing on several
Latin American countries. It then examines broader judicial re-
form initiatives in the region sponsored by international organi-
zations such as the World Bank.
A. Criminal Procedure Reforms
Many Latin American countries have undertaken significant
criminal justice reforms that seek to increase the speed in which
cases are processed and to address problems such as excessive
pretrial detention. While some of the impetus has been a desire
for greater efficiency, concerns about human rights violations
have also played an important role. USAID's Administration of
Justice program has long stressed the link between improvement
in the administration of criminal cases and human rights, 7
though often with limited success .2  The reforms reflect the his-
toric shift from an inquisitorial to adversarial system now under-
way in countries throughout Latin America. The reforms also,
however, underscore the importance of other factors, such as
the behavior of key institutional actors and a country's political
and social history, in producing meaningful change in areas like
pretrial detention. Several reform projects are summarized be-
low.
26. See ICCPR, supra n.19, art. 14(2); see also American Convention on Human
Rights, supra n.20, art. 8(2); Gim6nez v. Argentina, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Case 11.245 (1996) ("[T]he risk of inverting the presumption of inno-
cence increases with an unreasonably prolonged pre-trial incarceration. The guarantee
of the presumption of innocence becomes increasingly empty and ultimately a mockery
when pre-trial imprisonment is prolonged unreasonably.").
27. See Jos6 E. Alverez, Promoting the 'Rule of Law' in Latin Ametica: Problems and
Prospects, 25 GEO. WAsIJ. INT'L L. & ECON. 281, 289 (1991).
28. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY, ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 172
(1999) (discussing the changing role of USAID in Guatemala since the 1980s).
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1. Chile
Chile has undertaken sweeping changes to its criminal jus-
tice system.29 In 2001, Chile started to implement a new code of
criminal procedure that dramatically restructures its criminal
justice system, abandoning elements of an inquisitorial system in
favor of an adversarial one. The reforms have already been im-
plemented in areas outside Santiago and will be implemented in
the capital beginning in 2004."o Initial reports suggest the re-
forms have brought a more transparent process, greater protec-
tion of defendants' rights, and quicker trials.3
The reforms grew out of two different impulses: the reac-
tion to the traumatic human rights abuses of the 1970s and
1980s, and the desire to increase the efficiency of the judicial
sector.3 The reforms transform the roles of key players in the
judicial system, moving toward the tripartite system of American
criminal procedure: prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge.
Prosecutors have become the institutional actors responsible for
bringing and managing criminal actions, separating them from
the judicial branch, under which they formerly operated3", and
giving them the authority to exercise their discretion to dismiss
certain minor offenses.14 The reforms also create an important
role by defense attorneys, who are now responsible, in principle
if not in practice, for protecting basic trial rights.35 Judges also
have a dramatically different role under the new system. The
reforms transform judges from the actors who once controlled
the entire investigation, presentation of evidence, and final de-
termination, into independent, impartial referees.3" In addi-
tion, the reforms introduce various case management devices to
29. See Chile Begins Major Judicial Reform Effort, REUTERs Bus. BRIEFINGS, Dec. 16,
2000.
30. See David Bosco, Santiagos Aj/ershocks, LFGAL AFFAIwS 67, 68-69 Uuly-Aug. 2002).
31. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS: CHILE (2001).
32. See Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Pnquisitorial Systems: The
Rule of Law and Prospects For Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM.
323, 324, 328 (1998).
33. See id. at 337.
34. See id. at 340-41 (adopting the "opportunity principle," which gives prosecutors
the power to dismiss some cases based on certain criteria, but makes. the exercise of
such power subect to a judicial check); cf Miijan Damalka, Structures of Authority and
Comparative Crimninal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 503-04 (1975) (describing the system of
"mandatory prosecution" in civil law systems).
35. See Rodrigo, supra n.32, at 348-50.
36. Id. at 353.
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speed the processing of cases, including time limits for police to
file a complaint, a two-year limit on investigations, and coordina-
tion of the court calendar: 7
Thus far, the reforms have strengthened the presumption
of innocence and sparked the establishment of a professional
public defender service." The reforms should benefit from the
increasing approval of the judiciary that preceded them and
from the inclusion of a range of actors from political and civil
society in the reform process."9 Ultimately, the reforms' impact
on pretrial detention will be measured not primarily by formal
changes to criminal procedure codes, but rather by altering the
way cases are handled through fundamental institutional
change. To succeed, the reforms will also have to overcome the
country's traditional resistance to the principle of the presump-
tion of innocence. °
2. Venezuela
Venezuela, which has historically had one of the most severe
pretrial detention problems in the region, has also instituted re-
forms to its criminal procedure code. The new code, the Codigo
Organico Processal Penal ("COPP"), entered into force in July
1999. The COPP makes far-reaching changes to the criminal jus-
tice system,4 establishing open, public trials with oral proceed-
ings and verdicts by juries or panels of judges. It also limits the
time police may detain persons without charges and places inves-
tigations under the supervision of prosecutors, turning judges -
formerly investigators - into impartial arbiters. The COPP pro-
vides that an individual accused of a crime cannot be detained
during criminal proceedings unless he is seized in the act of
committing the crime or the judge finds that there is a danger
the accused may flee or obstruct the investigation.2 Under no
circumstances may an accused person be detained longer than
the possible minimum sentence for the alleged crime, nor may
37. Id. at 362-63.
38. See Bosco, supra n.30, at 68.
39. See WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND DFMO(:RA'IIC DECAY IN .A'TIN
AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN iHE RULE oF LAW 151-52 (2000).
40. See id. at 69; cf CAROTHERS, supra n.28, at 176 (noting that the desire for crimi-
nal justice reform may be expressed in terms of getting "tougher" on crime).
41. See, e.g., Steven Gutkin, Latin Americans Revamp Court Systems That Can't Deliver
Justice, Assoc. PRESS (May 31, 1998) (summarizing the proposed changes).
42. DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORIS: VENEZUELA, supra n.6.
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the detention exceed two years.43 An important goal of the
changes is to create a speedy, open public trial process in place
of the old, closed inquisitorial process.44 Thus far, reforms ap-
pear to have had some success in reducing rates of pretrial de-
tention.45 More recent amendments to the COPP, however, in-
crease the circumstances under which an accused may be de-
tained, and thus threaten to limit the impact of the reforms.4 6
3. Guatemala
Like other Latin American countries, Guatemala has over-
crowded prisons and high rates of pretrial detention.47 In 1994,
Guatemala initiated sweeping reforms of its criminal procedure
code, including shifting the responsibility for investigations from
judges to prosecutors, increasing the power of defendants to op-
pose prosecution and contest the investigation, adopting oral tri-
als,45 and allowing for plea bargaining in a number of cases. 9
The reforms also establish a presumption of innocence, which
limits pretrial detention to exceptional circumstances and spe-
cific conditions such as reasonable risk of flight.511 In no case
may detention last for more than one year or for a longer period
of time than the accused could have been incarcerated had he
been convicted of the crime charged.1
Guatemala also approved new reforms to the code in 1997
that allow for greater participation in the criminal justice system
by indigenous communities. 52 For example, the reforms create
community courts with authority to resolve less serious criminal
cases. These courts can use local law or practice, including in-
43. Id.
44. See PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAl., slupra n.5, at 38-39.
45. See supra n.6.
46. See DEPARTMENT OF STArE COUNTRY REPORTS: VENEZUELA, supra n.6 (describing
more recent reforms and public perceptions that the COPP has been responsible for
increase in crime).
47. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS: GUATEMALA (2001).
48. See Hendrix, supra n.15, at 393-94.
49. Id. at 397-98.
50. Id. at 394-95.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 402. Similarly, in Bolivia, criminal justice reform includes increased re-
spect for indigenous languages and tribal governments. See Sebastian Rotella, A New
Breed ofJnstice Reshaping Latin America Reform: Watchdogs in Bolivia help change archaic law
system, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1999, at Al.
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digenous law, with certain restrictions."'
Problems, nonetheless, still persist, such as the weakness of
the defense bar 4 and corruption and inefficiency among the ju-
diciary.55 Gains in establishing respect for the rule of law have
also been limited.5 " For example, one study found that while the
reforms give judges in Guatemala significant power to seek cor-
roborating evidence in criminal cases, many judges fail to use
that power, and cases are thus often decided based on incom-
plete evidence.5 7 Thus, notwithstanding the procedural reforms
and rapid expansion of donor activity,5" the overall changes in
criminal justice systems have been modest and problems like
pretrial detention remain severe.
B. Judicial Reform
Criminal procedure reforms reflect a broader trend of judi-
cial reform initiatives underway throughout the region. Numer-
ous Latin American countries have undergone extensive reforms
of their judicial systems over the last two decades, often with the
help of donor organizations like the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank ("IDB"), as well as government
agencies like USAID.Y' These reforms emphasize the rule of law,
which includes strengthening the judicial branch, speeding the
processing of cases, and professionalizing the bench and bar."'
International organizations may have different priorities. The
World Bank, for example, firmly links judicial reform to foster-
ing economic growth and alleviating poverty."' USAID has often
focused specifically on improving the functioning of a country's
judicial and legal system." Although these broader judicial re-
53. See Hendrix, surnna, n. 15, at 403.
54. /d. at 407-08.
55. See RCOTH S, su/n'a n.28, at 81.
56. See id. at 315-16.
57. See Luis PASARA, L\s DE(]ISIONS JUDIIALES EN GUATEMAI. : UN ANALYSIS DE
SENTI ENCIAS EMITAI)AS POR LOS TRIIUNAiES, discussed in Michael Dodson, Assessing Judi-
cial Refoirm, in Latin America, 37 LATIN AMERICAN RESEARHii REV. 200 (2002).
58. See CxOTHLRS, suna n.28, at 165 (describing how Guatemala is "overrun with
aid programs.").
59. Richard E. Messick, Judicial ReJirm and Economic Development: A S'n nv of the
Issues, VORLI) BANK RSFARCI-I OBSERVIER (Feb. 1999).
60. See World Batnk and Legal Institutions, at wwwl .worldbank.org/publicsector/le-
gal/workdbank.htm.
61. Id.
62. See Alverez, su/na n.27, at 313-14.
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forms do not directly focus on curbing prolonged pretrial deten-
tion, they may nonetheless help reduce the severity of the prob-
lem by promoting good government and efficiency. A much
greater impact could be realized, however, if leading donor or-
ganizations like the World Bank more clearly incorporated a
commitment to combating human rights abuses into their judi-
cial reform programs.
1. Economic Development and the Judicial System
The link between a country's judicial system and its ability
to foster private transactions - the subject of ongoing debate -
dates back several centuries." Many reformers and commenta-
tors now stress the importance of an effective judicial system in
both protecting property rights and ensuring the business rela-
tionships critical to market transactions."4 There appears to be
at least some correlation between the quality of a country's legal
institutions and the pace of its economic development,6 5 though
the strength of the link remains a matter of debate.
In the last decade, donor organizations like the World
Bank, IDB, and the Asian Development Bank have approved or
initiated over US$500 million in loans for judicial reform
projects in twenty-six countries. USAID spent almost US$200
million on similar projects during the same period."" At present,
the majority of developing countries and former socialist states
receive some type of assistance to help them reform their judi-
cial systems.6 7 As a result, an unprecedented degree of financial
and technical resources are presently focused on facilitating ju-
dicial reform.68
Latin America has been the target of numerous judicial re-
form projects in the past several decades. USAID helped initiate
the process with judicial reform programs in Central America in
63. See Messick, sulna n.48. Adam Smith would later link a nation's economic de-
velopment with the establishment of "a tolerable administration of justice." Id.
64. See id. (citing research); see also PRILLAMAN, supra n.39, at I (discussing the link
between a strong judiciary and sustainable economic development).
65. See, e.g., CAROTHERS, supra n.28, at 164. Some commentators note that eco-
nomic development may also create better institutions. See Alberto Chong & Cesar Cal-
deron, Causality and Feedback Between Instilutional Measures and Economic Growth, 12 ECON.
& POL. 69 (2000)
66. See Messick, supra n.48.
67. See id.
68. See id.
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the 1980s." ' By the end of the 1990s, the World Bank, and later
the IDB, approved or were considering thirty judicial or legal
reform projects in seventeen countries in the region by the early
1990s. 70
In Latin America, a well-functioning judicial system is widely
considered to play a role in fostering private sector development
within the market economy. 7' To enhance the protection of
property and contract rights, governments have introduced vari-
ous measures including modernizing property registries, stream-
lining judicial procedures, creating alternative dispute resolu-
tion systems, and professionalizing the bench and bar. " As an
empirical matter, however, there remains some question as to
the overall effect of rule of law reforms on economic develop-
ment.
7 3
Furthermore, the path to judicial reform is not without ob-
stacles. Attempts to alter judicial systems can engender opposi-
tion from existing actors, such as a nation's organized bar, whose
members may fear that quicker trials will translate into a decline
in their status and value to the system. 74 Reforms may fail when
they lack the participation of important sectors in the country,
and ought, therefore, to seek to foster efficient, responsible pub-
lic institutions and agencies rather than focus exclusively on the
judiciary. 7" Judicial reform, in short, should not be treated
solely as a technical matter nor should political factors be ig-
69. See Alverez, supra n.27, at 285 (describing the history of the Administration of
Justice program which provided, inter alia, support for specialized professional training,
programs to enhance prosecutorial and judicial capabilities, strengthening professional
organizations, and increasing the availability of legal materials).
70. See LAWYERS COMMIYIEE FOR HUMAN Ricis, BUILDING ON QUICKSAND: THE
CO [..AI'SE OF THE WORLD BANK'S JUDICIAl REFORM PROJECT IN PFRU (April 2000) [here-
inafter BuILDING ON QUICKSAND].
71. See Edgardo Buscaglia, A Quantitative Assessment of the Efficiency oj the Judicial
Sector in Latin America, 17 INT'L Rv. LAw & ECON. (1997); Alverez, supra n.27, at 324
(noting the implicit assumption of USAID's Administration of Justice program that an
independent and efficient judiciary is conducive to economic development).
72. See BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supra n.70.
73. See, e.g., Aymo Brunetti & Beatrice Weder, Political Sources of Growth: A Critical
Note on Measurement, Puii. CHOICE 82, 125-34 (1995); see also Messick, supra n. 48 (noting
that rigorous econometric methods for verifying this hypothesis are in their infancy).
74. See Messick, sn/era n.48.
75. See, e.g., Patrick McAuslan, Law, Governance, and the Development of the Market:
Practical Problems and Possible Solutions, in JUIO FAUNDEZ, GooD GOVERNANCE AND LxW:
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1997).
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nored in the process.7
A broader critique of judicial reform posits that the en-
deavor itself is inherently flawed and will simply repeat the mis-
takes of the law and development movement of the 1960s. This
movement, which originated at leading American law schools,
espoused the idea that law was central to the development pro-
cess. Law was viewed as a tool that could be used to promote
social reform, with lawyers and judges acting as social engi-
neers. 77 Proponents believed that law and development would
ultimately lead to the creation of institutions in developing
countries much like those in the advanced liberal democracies
of the United States and western Europe. 78 This movement rep-
resented an ambitious attempt by USAID, the Ford Foundation,
and other private American donors to reform the judicial sys-
tems and substantive laws of developing nations. 79 Although the
movement eventually came under severe criticism"' and essen-
tially collapsed, American lawyers and legal scholars continue to
act in ways that seek to shape the fundamental economic and
political institutions of the developing world. 8 The extent to
which current judicial reform projects can avoid the fate of the
law and development movement has yet to be determined.
2. The World Bank and the Limits of Judicial Reform
The potential impact of judicial reforms on pretrial deten-
76. See PRIL[AMAN, supra n.39, at 4-5.
77. See John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style,
Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 Am J. COMP. L. 457 (1977).
78. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Book Review, The Lessons of Law and Development, 89
AM.J. INT'L L. 470, 473 (1995).
79. Id. at 472-74.
80. See, e.g., David Trubek & Mark Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Re-
flections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wisc. L. REV.
1062, 1080 (1974) (attacking the movement's legal liberal model as "ethnocentric and
naive."); Alverez, supra n.27, at 287 (noting that law and development programs re-
flected faith in "the transformative power of law.").
81. See Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for
Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1998) (arguing that "the thrust of interna-
tional development policy today remains essentially what it was in the sixties and seven-
ties: to export markets, democracy, and the rule of law to the developing world.");
Hugo Fruhling, From Dictatorship to Democracy: Law and Social Change in the Andean Region
and the Southern Cone of South America, in MANY ROADS: TilE LAw-RELATED WORK OF FORD
FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds.,
2000) (noting the influence of Ford Foundation projects on the current criminal proce-
dure reform in Chile).
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tion rates has been limited by attempts to divorce economic de-
velopment from human rights abuses. This shortcoming may be
traced to the policies governing leading international donor or-
ganizations.
The World Bank, the largest and most influential interna-
tional donor organization, is prohibited by its Articles of Agree-
ment from interfering in the political affairs of its members.
The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") operates under simi-
lar restrictions. The World Bank has construed the prohibition
in its Articles of Agreement as precluding support of judicial re-
form projects unless relevant to a country's economic develop-
ment and the Bank's lending strategy for that country.8 2 Like
the Bank, the IMF views human rights law as "political," and,
therefore, beyond the scope of its authority and ability, which is
it sees as confined to economic issues.8 3
Thus, in contrast to USAID, which has focused extensively
on criminal justice reform, the World Bank, the leading non-
state actor in promoting judicial reform, has tended to avoid pe-
nal issues and procedures. 4 Initial projects, such as the exten-
sive Venezuela Judicial Infrastructure Project, approved in 1992,
focused on administrative and management reforms, and the
training of judges.85 The Bank has addressed issues like pretrial
detention only indirectly, by promoting good government and
judicial efficiency.
The World Bank has, however, increasingly moved from a
narrow, technical focus to a more comprehensive view of legal
systems that recognizes the importance ofjudicial independence
in the overall scheme of reform.8" In Peru, for example, when
the Bank realized that the government was undermining judicial
independence, it cancelled the US$22.5 million judicial reform
82. 2 Ti-iE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (Ibrahim F. Shihata ed., 1995).
83. See Balikrishnan Ralagopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft Interna-
tional Law ofthe IMF and Human Rights, 11 B.U. INT'L L.'. 81 (1993). In contrast to the
World Bank, which is principally a developnent institution originally designed to assist
postwar reconstrtuction, the IMF was designed to maintain an orderly system of receipts
and payments between countries. See id. at 87-88 (describing the various constraints on
the IMF).
84. See LAWERS COMNI1rEE FOR HUMAN RIGI-'S, HALFWANYTO REFORM: TuE WORLD
BANK AND THEI VFNEZUILAJUSTICE SYSTEM (1996) [hereinafter HALFWAY TO REFORM].
85. See id.
86. See BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supr n.70.
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IV. REDUCING PRETRIAL DETENTION
This Part discusses various ways to reduce the rate of pretrial
detention in Latin America, including: creating effective provi-
sions for pretrial release such as bail statutes; changing the be-
havior of key institutional actors like judges, prosecutors, and de-
fense attorneys; adapting reforms to an individual country's par-
ticular history, culture, and politics; and eliminating obstacles
that preclude leading donor organizations like the World Bank
from linking judicial reform efforts with human rights abuses
like pretrial detention.
A. Creating Effective Bail Provisions
While criminal procedure reforms offer the promise of
quicker case resolution and a decrease in rates of pretrial deten-
tion, they often do not go far enough. Creating effective provi-
sions for pretrial release is an important way to address excessive
pretrial detention."x In Bolivia, courts are only now beginning
to provide bail for certain prisoners, and judges may still detain
suspects tinder arrest if considered a flight risk or for obstruction
of justice. 9 In the Dominican Republic, few defendants are ac-
tually granted bail despite severe problems of pretrial deten-
tion.'51 In Colombia, bail is available only in connection with mi-
nor offenses or after extremely long periods of time detained
before trial.9 Merely creating the necessary legal framework,
however, will not suffice, as judges and other actors in the crimi-
nal justice system must become accustomed to a system in which
pretrial release is more routinely granted.
87. See id.
88. Human Rights Watch, Excessive Pretrial Detention, available at http://www.hrw.
org/alvocacy/prisons/pretrial.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002) (describing need for ex-
pansion of pretrial release). In the United States, for example, federal law establishes a
presumption in favor of pretrial release, and the Bail Reform Act authorizes release on
bail absent a risk of flight or danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142; United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the Bail Reform Act); Michael K.
Ryan & Ben jamin K. Olson, Bail, 88 GEO. L.J. 1157 (2000).
89. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY RFPORTS: BoLIVIA (2001).
90. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUN'-rmy REPORTS: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (2001).
91. See DEPARTMENT OF SrAIE COUNTRY RIPORTS: COLOMBIA (2001).
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B. Changing How Actors Behave, As Well As Criminal Codes
Reforming criminal codes and transforming criminal justice
systems from an inquisitive to adversarial model can help ad-
dress the problem of excessive pretrial detention. There may,
nevertheless, be limits to the improvements to be gained from
borrowing procedural devices from another type of system - in
this case from adversarial systems - without altering the behav-
ior of key organizational actors like prosecutors and defense at-
torneys. As William T. Pizzi cautions, parts of one system, such
as prosecutorial discretion in an adversarial system, "cannot eas-
ily be separated from the rest of the system and isolated for in-
corporation in a different legal system. '  Criminal procedure
reflects a society's cultural, historical, and political values, and
the adoption of new forms, without more, will likely prove lim-
ited in scope." There may be resistance to implementing re-
forms that change formal legal procedures as well as the way the
system operates in practice and the respective roles of the pri-
mary actors." Civil law systems not only have different historical
roots and traditions than adversarial ones,' 5 but also have gradu-
ally evolved into distinct systems with their own views about au-
thority, rules, methods of organization, and the conception of
justice itself.9" Thus, the improvement in rates of pretrial deten-
tion to be gained from the adoption of the principles and forms
of an adversarial system depends to some extent on whether
there are corresponding changes at an institutional and struc-
tural level. Judicial reform may ultimately prove more political
92. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Refon, 54 O-1o Sr. L:J. 1325,
1373 (1993). Although Professor Pizzi was discussing the converse - the possible
adoption by adversarial systems of civil law controls like judicial review of prosecutorial
action - his general point applies here. Id.
93. See id. Judicial reforms elsewhere demonstrate this point. Cf Steven Lee My-
ers, Russia Glances to the West for its New Legal Code, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at Al
(describing doubts about the impact of sweeping changes to Russia's criminal code
given "the day-to-day practice of Russian justice, where corruption is rife and resistance
to change deeply entrenched" and noting that changes to Russia's code guarantees a
suspect legal representation from the time of arrest but fails to detail how lawyers will
be paid when defendants cannot afford them).
94. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY RI'ORTS: VENFZUELA, supra n.6 (suTmmariz-
ing obstacles implementing Venezuela's new criminal procedure code).
95. See Damagka, su/a n.34, at 529-43.
96. See id. at 487-529.
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and culture than technical in nature.97 Certainly, as the case of
Peru under Alberto Fujimori demonstrates, modernization of
the judiciary will not bring about meaningful reform in pretrial
detention and other areas unless the underlying principle ofju-
dicial independence is firmly established.98
Furthermore, reducing excessive pretrial detention requires
administrative changes that increase efficiency. For example,
Bolivia's new Code of Criminal Procedure contains fixed limits
on the amount of time defendants can be held awaiting trial and
sentencing."' Even so, prolonged detention remains a problem
due to factors such as judicial corruption, lack of public defend-
ers, poor case-tracking mechanisms, and complex criminal jus-
tice procedures.' 0 0
The limit of normative change on pretrial detention rates
within an adversarial system is illustrated by the United States'
attempt to improve efficiency in processing criminal cases. In
the early 1970s, the United States Congress and state legislatures
enacted "speedy trial" acts to ensure that criminal cases were de-
cided quickly. The acts set specific deadlines which, if not met,
would lead to dismissal of cases. " " The mere adoption of these
laws, however, has generally failed to shorten disposition times.
Rather, the key determinant in whether "speedy trial" acts met
their goals was whether they affected key institutional actors like
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. 10 2
Proponents of judicial reform in Latin America are exper-
iencing a similar phenomenon. Initially, the primary focus was
on reforming criminal procedure codes and moving towards a
97. See Dodson, supra n.57.
98. See LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998), cited in Dod-
son, supra n.57.
99. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS: BOLIVIA, supra n.89 (fixing pe-
riod at eighteen months).
100. Id.
101. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161 (providing that an individual arrested for a federal of-
fense must be indicted within thirty days of arrest and, where a plea of not guilty is
entered, brought to trial within seventy days of the filing of the indictment, or from the
date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such
charge is pending, whichever date occurs last).
102. SeeJ. Andrew Read, Comment, Open-Ended Continuances: An End Run Around
the Speedy Trial Act, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 733 (1997) (noting the pattern of federal
judges granting "open-ended continuances" to avoid the strict limits of the Speedy Trial
Act).
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more adversarial system. More recently, the emphasis has
shifted to changing how key organizational actors behave by re-
creating or reorganizing police forces, prosecution agencies, and
public defender offices." 3 Continued focus on these institu-
tional actors and arrangements will be a critical part of reform
efforts. Judicial reform requires not only better trained judges
but also the necessary infrastructure of institutions that consti-
tute a well-functioning legal system."'"
C. Adopting Reforms to a Country's Political, Social,
and Cultural History
To succeed, reforms must also be adapted to the particular
history and climate of the target country. In countries where
tension with indigenous groups has led to political unrest, civil
war, and widespread human rights abuses by the military, crimi-
nal procedure reforms must take account of how the system had
previously acted as a tool for the oppression of ethnic minorities.
Similarly, in societies historically plagued by injustice and ine-
quality, inclusion of a broad sector of society and a more bottom-
up approach will likely prove critical to meaningful reform.'
1 05
In Guatemala, for example, the judicial reforms of the
1980s, which were backed by USAID funding, were undermined
by their lack of popular support and by strong resistance from
the targeted institutions themselves. " ' By creating community
courts with jurisdiction over less serious criminal cases that give
indigenous communities a greater stake and degree of auton-
omy, Guatemala's most recent judicial reform effort has taken
an important step in the direction of building broader popular
support for judicial reform and overcoming the negative associa-
tions of past efforts." 7 Yet, while judicial reform efforts have
103. See, e.g., DEPARTMFNT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
suln'a n.90 (describing modest increases in availability of sate-funded public defenders
in the Dominican Republic); DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS: GUAFEMAla\,
supra n.47 (describing the creation in Guatemala of justice centers that untie judges,
public defenders, prosecutors, police, and others in a team approach to addressing
problems).
104. See generally LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOC(RAY: TOWARD CONSOLIDA-
TION 111-12 (1999) (describing the variotLs institutions that mtLst be part of successful
judicial and legal reform).
105. See CAROTHERS, supra n.28, at 169.
106. See id. at 172.
107. See sulna nn. 52-53 and accompanying text.
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
made some progress there, the judiciary and other government
institutions remain plagued by corruption, incompetence, and
inefficiency, and the principle of the rule of law remains tenu-
ous. 108
Similarly, judicial reform in El Salvador must address the
legacy of widespread human rights abuses during the Salvadoran
civil war of the 1980s and the impunity of the military.10 9 U.S.
involvement in that conflict, at the same time USAID was back-
ing judicial reform, created feelings of suspicion and distrust
that current reform efforts must work to overcome. Following
the peace accords, reform of El Salvador's criminal justice system
became a high priority in the effort to rebuild the country's insti-
tutions, and a number of important laws were passed, including
restrictions on pretrial detention.'") Their successful implemen-
tation has, however, been undercut by the lack of widespread
national support, including among members of the judiciary,
and by rising crime rates, which the police and security forces
attribute to the criminal justice reforms themselves. 1'
Chile presents a related challenge - the judiciary's associa-
tion with the human rights abuses committed during a prior mil-
itary dictatorship. The judiciary has long been criticized for its
actions during the Pinochet regime, including its refusal to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the military tribunals, its application of laws
granting amnesty to military officials, and its rejection of at-
tempts by families of victims to seek justice against the perpetra-
tors. Given the link between the judiciary and the former mili-
tary regime, criminal procedure reform must now be accompa-
nied by genuine judicial independence and the promotion of
defendants' rights in order to have a meaningful impact.
D. Overcoming the Prohibition on "Political" Interference by
Leading Donor Organizations
The effort to combat human rights abuses like pretrial de-
tention will be advanced by harnessing the potential impact of
judicial reforms by donor organizations such as the World Bank
108. See Carothers, supra n.28, at 81.
109. See MARGARFT POPKIN, PEACE WITIOUT JUSTICE: OBSTACLES To BUILDING TIHE
RULE OF LAW IN Ei SALVADOR, cited in Dodson, supra n.57.
110. See id.
111. See id.
2003] 1773
1774 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL IAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1754
and IMF. Generally, the World Bank has considered human
rights violations in lending decisions only when those violations
have amounted to clear or preponderantly economic con-
cerns.1 2 While the World Bank has increasingly supported judi-
cial reform projects in Latin America,' it does not support
criminal procedure reforms because it considers them "political"
and thus in violation of its Articles of Agreement.' "'
The World Bank's prohibition on interference with the "po-
litical affairs" of a member should not preclude attempts to pro-
tect against human rights abuses like prolonged pretrial deten-
tion. The Bank already views its development mandate as going
beyond economic advancement.1 1 Moreover, despite the em-
phasis in its Articles of Agreement on "economic considerations"
and the prohibition on interference in a member state's "politi-
cal affairs," the Articles do not define either term, granting the
Bank considerable leeway in fleshing out their meaning." 6 An
early concentration on the financial sector led to a focus on gov-
ernment regulation, which in turn led to policies to reform the
judicial sector." 7 The Bank has gradually expanded its view of
what factors qualify as "economic considerations" to include
those operations that promote a range of economic, social, and
cultural rights such as health, education, social welfare, and em-
ployment. '" The Bank's loans to developing countries are now
considered the country's principal source of foreign capital, po-
tentially giving the Bank significant influence over human rights
112. See John D. Ciorciari, The Lawful Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World Bank
Credit Decisions: An Interpretive Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement, 33 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 331, 337 (2000).
113. See BUILDING ON QUICK-SAND, supra n.70 and accompanying text.
114. According to Article IV:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any mem-
ber, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of
the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impar-
tially in order to [promote economic development, increase productivity, and
thus raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of the world.]
The World Bank Articles of Agreement, art. IV, Sec. 10.
115. See Ciorciari, supra n. 112, at 355.
116. See Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IM, and Human Rights, 6 TRANS-
NAT'I L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 49-56 (1996). The Bank has defined an economic
factor as any factor that has a "direct and obvious economic effect relevant to the
[World Bank's] work." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. See id. at 54.
118. See id. at 57.
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issues like excessive pretrial detention." '
Indeed, the World Bank's own promotion of good govern-
ment reforms undercuts its position that human rights are be-
yond its mandate.' 2  A growing body of evidence links economic
development to the protection and promotion of human
rights, 12' and human rights may be linked to a range of the
Bank's activities. For example, when a World Bank-financed ju-
dicial reform program is aimed at a specific aspect of a judici-
ary's operations, it can influence the way that judicial system will
function for all people.'2 2 The concern about the reliability of a
judicial system among investors embodies a subset of broader
concerns about judicial insecurity due to fear of arbitrary arrest
and imprisonment and the absence of fair pretrial and trial pro-
cedures. 2 - Even a seemingly "political" determination like guar-
anteeing criminal defendants procedural rights can in the long-
run have important economic effects, such as improved business
confidence124 - a central goal of the type of "rule of law" re-
forms the Bank widely sponsors.'2  In fact, changes in judicial
efficiency have been measured by documenting changes in times
to disposition in criminal cases and pretrial detention rates.
126
A number of solutions have been proposed to overcome the
World Bank's resistance to promoting and protecting human
rights. The Bank could interpret the prohibition in its Articles
of Agreement to bar involvement in domestic partisan affairs. 1
27
It could also adopt the view that the prohibition on political in-
terference does not extend to abuses of "fundamental human
rights.' 1 28 Alternatively, the Bank could amend its Articles of
Agreement to explicitly grant it the right to consider human
rights issues in lending decisions and to authorize it to refuse to
enter into or to withdraw loans from countries that consistently
119. See Halim Moris, The World Bank and Human Rights: Indispensable Partnership or
Mismatched Alliance?, 4 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 173, 175 (1997).
120. See Bradlow, supra n.116, at 65.
121. See supra nn.63-65 and accompanying text; see also Rajagopal, supra n.71, at 87.
122. See Bradlow, supra n.116, at 59.
123. See HALFWAY TO REFORM, suptra n.84.
124. See Bradlow, supra n.118, at 62.
125. See supra nn.63-73 and accompanying text.
126. See PRILLAMAN, supra n.39, at 148-49 (providing statistics from Brazil and
Chile).
127. See Bradlow, supra n.116, at 81.
128. See Ciorciari, supra n.112, at 370.
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violate human rights. It might even create a sub-agency to evalu-
ate the impact of lending decisions on human rights conditions
in a borrowing country. 12 1
Similarly, there is good reason for the IMF to drop its resis-
tance to considering human rights in its lending policies. Al-
though the IMF was initially seen as a short-term money institu-
tion, it has become increasingly involved in long-term develop-
ment.130  The IMF's articles grant it "wide international
responsibilities" in "economic and related fields," suggesting
that the IMF could permissibly incorporate related fields like
human rights into its decisions.'' Indeed, as development is in-
creasingly understood to encompass human rights, it becomes
more difficult to separate development issues from human rights
issues. 11
2
Thus, notwithstanding their principal focus on economic
development, international financial institutions like the World
Bank and IMF can still play an important role in addressing
human rights issues, especially those like pretrial detention that
are closely connected to improving the efficiency of a country's
judicial system."'
CONCLUSION
Prolonged pretrial detention remains one of the most sig-
nificant human rights problems in Latin America today and con-
tributes to the overcrowding, violence, and other deplorable
conditions in the region's prisons. Many Latin American coun-
tries have introduced significant changes to their criminal proce-
dure codes, marking a historic shift from an inquisitorial to an
adversarial system. Meanwhile, international donor organiza-
tions like the World Bank continue to sponsor judicial reform
initiatives to increase efficiency and promote economic develop-
ment. While human rights advocacy and criminal procedure re-
129. See Moris, supra n. 119, at 199-200.
130. See Rajagopal, supra n.83, at 92.
131. Id. at 94 (quoting Article 1(2)).
132. See id. at 97.
133. See Bradlow, supra n. 116, at 86. But see Moris, supra n. 119, at 182 (describing
the grounds cited by those who oppose action by the World Bank on human rights,
including violation of the Bank's Articles of Agreement, "violation of international law
prohibiting coercion in any form including economic coercion, violation of principles
of sovereign integrity and sovereign equality, and violation of recipient states' right to
development.").
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forms represent an important part of combating prolonged pre-
trial detention, they must be joined with other changes, such as
establishing effective provisions for pretrial release, altering the
behavior of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, adapting
reforms to an individual country's particular history and social
context, and overcoming the resistance of influential donor or-
ganizations like the World Bank to factoring human rights into
their lending policies.
